


Malware, Anti-Malware ... and Street Fighter V

A never ending cat-and-mouse game



Jerre Starink - j.a.l.starink@utwente.nl

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
Agenda

- The Basics of Anti-Malware
- Why is it hard on modern operating systems
- Street Fighter V
- Moving Forward


The Basics of Anti-Malware

- Typically based on Dynamic Analysis.
- Allow the program to run, but stop it in its tracks when it does something bad.

The Basics of Anti-Malware



The Basics of Anti-Malware



Userspace Inline Hooking

```
18009d5df    ...
ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile:
18009d5e0    MOV      R10, RCX
18009d5e3    MOV      EAX, 0x8
18009d5e8    TEST     byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0x1
18009d5f0    JNZ     0x18009d5f5
18009d5f2    SYSCALL
18009d5f4    RET
18009d5f5    INT     0x2e
18009d5f7    RET
18009d5f8    ...
```

ntdll.dll (in memory)

Userspace Inline Hooking

```
18009d5df    ...
ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile:
18009d5e0    JMP    antimalware!MyNtWriteFile
18009d5e3    MOV    EAX, 0x8
18009d5e8    TEST   byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0x1
18009d5f0    JNZ    0x18009d5f5
18009d5f2    SYSCALL
18009d5f4    RET
18009d5f5    INT    0x2e
18009d5f7    RET
18009d5f8    ...
```

ntdll.dll (in memory)

Redirection
to Anti-Malware

```
// antimalware.c

int MyNtWriteFile(...) {
    print("NtWriteFile was called");
    // ...
    return NtWriteFile(...);
}
```

Userspace Inline Hooking

- Pros:
 - Practical, easy to implement.
 - You can place them anywhere on any function.
 - You have a lot of freedom.

Userspace Inline Hooking

```
18009d5df    ...
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18009d5f0    JNZ      0x18009d5f5
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18009d5f7    RET
18009d5f8    ...
```

ntdll.dll (in memory)

Userspace Inline Hooking

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18009d5f7    RET
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```

ntdll.dll (in memory)

```
def NtWriteFile(...):
    MOV    R10, RCX
    MOV    EAX, 0x8
    TEST   byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0x1
    JNZ    0x18009d5f5
    SYSCALL
    RET
    INT    0x2e
    RET
```

ntdll.dll (on disk)

Userspace Inline (Un)Hooking

```
18009d5df    ...
ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile:
18009d5e0    MOV    R10, RCX
18009d5e3    MOV    EAX, 0x8
18009d5e8    TEST   byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0x1
18009d5f0    JNZ    0x18009d5f5
18009d5f2    SYSCALL
18009d5f4    RET
18009d5f5    INT    0x2e
18009d5f7    RET
18009d5f8    ...
```

ntdll.dll (in memory)

Write back original
removes hook


```
def NtWriteFile(...):
    MOV    R10, RCX
    MOV    EAX, 0x8
    TEST   byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0x1
    JNZ    0x18009d5f5
    SYSCALL
    RET
    INT    0x2e
    RET
```

ntdll.dll (on disk)

Userspace Inline Hook Bypass

```
18009d5df    ...
ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile:
18009d5e0    JMP    antimalware!MyNtWriteFile
18009d5e3    MOV    EAX, 0x8
18009d5e8    TEST   byte ptr [0x7ffe0308], 0
18009d5f0    JNZ    0x18009d5f5
18009d5f2    SYSCALL
18009d5f4    RET
18009d5f5    INT    0x2e
18009d5f7    RET
18009d5f8    ...
```

ntdll.dll (in memory)




```
// evil.c
int main(...) {
    NtWriteFile("C:\\\\foo.txt", ...)
    __syscall(0x8, "C:\\\\foo.txt", ...);
}
```

Userspace Inline Hooking


- Pros:
 - Practical, easy to implement.
 - You can place them anywhere on any function.
 - You have a lot of freedom.
- Cons:
 - Hooks also reside in userspace.
 - Malware can just remove the hook again.
 - Malware can do direct system calls instead.

The Basics of Anti Malware



A NEW FOE HAS APPEARED!

CHALLENGER APPROACHING



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
Windows Vista™



Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard)

Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard)

- Periodically monitor critical code and data structures in the kernel.
 - If a change is detected, trigger a bugcheck.



Your PC ran into a problem and needs to restart. We're just collecting some error info, and then we'll restart for you.

40% complete



For more information about this issue and possible fixes, visit: <https://www.windows.com/stopcode>

If you call a support person, give them this info

Stop code: KERNEL_SECURITY_CHECK_FAILURE

Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard)

- Periodically monitor critical code and data structures in the kernel.
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- Great for Security!
 - Prevention of Out-of-Bound Write Vulnerabilities etc.

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- Periodically monitor critical code and data structures in the kernel.
 - If a change is detected, trigger a bugcheck.
- Great for Security!
 - Prevention of Out-of-Bound Write Vulnerabilities etc.
- Terrible for Security!
 - No more kernel changes = No more inline hooks = No more monitoring!

Microsoft's Answer

- Preemptively instrument important kernel code to prevent patches:

```
// NT-kernel-winxp.c

int NtWriteFile(...) {
    // ...
}
```

```
// NT-kernel-win11.c

int NtWriteFile(...) {
    notify_observers(...);

    // ...
}
```


Microsoft's Answer

- Preemptively instrument important kernel code to prevent patches:

But where to place the instrumentation?

What data do we include?

How about intervention?

The background of the slide features a dark gray or black surface with a series of thin, white, wavy lines that create a sense of depth and motion. These lines are more concentrated in the center and spread out towards the edges, forming a organic, flowing pattern.

“That’s just an engineering problem”

So... Problems Solved?



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Sidestep: CAPCOM Street Fighter V

- In 2016 CAPCOM released Street Fighter V.



CAPCOM®

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CAPCOM®


Sidestep: CAPCOM Street Fighter V

- In 2016 CAPCOM released Street Fighter V.
- Tournaments in user space call for Anti-Cheat.
- Anti-Cheat cannot live in userspace,
so CAPCOM made a kernel space Anti-Cheat.
- However, they were a bit... practical.



CAPCOM®

CAPCOM's Anti-Cheat Driver



CAPCOM's Anti-Cheat Driver

```
C# Decompile: IoCtl_Handler - (Capcom.sys)
1
2 bool IoCtl_Handler(byte *data_passed_in_from_userspace)
3 {
4     ulonglong old_cr4;
5     code *function_pointer;
6     MmGetSystemRoutineAddress *pMmGetSystemRoutineAddress;
7     byte *magic_value;
8
9     magic_value = *(byte **)(data_passed_in_from_userspace + -8);
10    if (magic_value == data_passed_in_from_userspace) {
11        pMmGetSystemRoutineAddress = MmGetSystemRoutineAddress_exref;
12        old_cr4 = 0;
13        function_pointer = (code *)data_passed_in_from_userspace;
14
15        (*function_pointer)(pMmGetSystemRoutineAddress);
16
17    }
18    return magic_value == data_passed_in_from_userspace;
19}
```

Out of scope of Thread Model?

Out of scope of Thread Model?




Ransomware Actor Abuses Genshin Impact Anti-Cheat Driver to Kill Antivirus

Hackers abuse Avast anti-rootkit driver to disable defenses

By Bill Toula

November 23, 2024 10:07 AM 0



6th February 2019, 12:36 PM

kdmapper - manual map your driver using a vulnerable driver by Intel

z175
n00ble

Join Date: Feb 2019

Posts: 4

So, this driver (iQWV64e.sys) comes as part of Intel LAN drivers and it allows to copy, read and write user/kernel memory, map phys. For code execution: I used a method described [here](#) (Executing shellcode)

Your driver must be compiled with /GS- option, and have custom driver entry point defined. (Basically the same kind of driver that you

Source: <https://github.com/z175/kdmapper>

Thanks to:
@wlan
@DarthTon
@ymcall

Moving forward

- Hook/instrument deeper?
 - The lower level you place the hooks, the less interpretable the information gets.
 - Is it really helping at this point?

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- Fully banish all kernel space code unless absolutely system critical.
 - Microsoft is starting to do this more in Win10-11.

Moving forward

- Hook/instrument deeper?
 - The lower level you place the hooks, the less interpretable the information gets.
 - Is it really helping at this point?
- Fully banish all kernel space code unless absolutely system critical.
 - Microsoft is starting to do this more in Win10-11.
- Shift to a different paradigm on how software is installed on Windows.
 - App Stores, Package managers, etc.



Thanks!

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